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FORFEITURE OF CONFRONTATION
RIGHTS AND THE COMPLICATED
DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
SOME THOUGHTS INSPIRED BY MYRNA
RAEDER
Aviva Orenstein*
Myrna was a great friend and a great scholar. What I admired most about
her was the way she integrated her devotion to intellectual rigor with her
commitment to justice. Both personally and in her scholarship, Myrna was
constantly concerned with the less fortunate, those people, such as battered
women or children of prisoners, who tend to be overlooked in standard legal
analysis. But she was not an ideologue. Married to her desire for justice was
Myrna’s careful argumentation, intellectual integrity, and thoughtfulness.
This approach was an important part of her legacy to me and others in the
academy; it was most apparent when two treasured values came into conflict.
Such a conflict arises when a victim of domestic violence does not testify
but the prosecution wishes to use her statement against the accused. We must
balance the importance of prosecuting crimes of domestic violence, thereby
holding batterers accountable, with the value of respecting the right of a
criminal defendant to confront the witnesses against him.1 Specifically,
under what circumstances can a prosecutor offer into evidence an out-ofcourt statement by a victim of domestic violence, despite the victim’s absence

* Aviva Orenstein is a Professor of Law and Val Nolan Fellow at the Indiana University
Maurer School of Law. Thanks to Southwestern School of Law for inviting me to participate in this
wonderful symposium. Thanks to Brian Hamilton for his research assistance. And as always, thanks
to my mother, Sylvia Orenstein, a retired public defender, appellate division, for her excellent
editing and commentary on this piece.
1. The right to confront witnesses comes from the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
to the United States Constitution. It provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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and unavailability for cross-examination, on the grounds that the accused
forfeited his confrontation right?2
In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington,3 the Supreme Court changed the
interpretation and the practical effect of the Confrontation Clause.
Overruling twenty-five years of prevailing precedent, Crawford held that for
a “testimonial statement” to be offered against the accused, the declarant
must be available for confrontation, or if unavailable, subject to cross at some
previous time.4
The practical effect of Crawford was to exclude many out-of-court
statements against the accused that had until then been readily admitted under
Ohio v. Roberts,5 which allowed statements that fell within firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions or that were particularly trustworthy to pass
Confrontation Clause muster.6 Nowhere was the effect of Crawford more
striking than in domestic violence cases,7 where victims often recant or refuse
to testify.8 Before Crawford, prosecutors had routinely relied on domestic
2. As will be evident throughout, Myrna was both prolific and insightful on the intersection
of confrontation and domestic violence. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Thoughts about Giles and
Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1329 (2010).
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (“In Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004), we held that this provision bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’”). Crawford’s reference to evidence that was subject to
cross-examination previously essentially ensured that evidence admitted under the former testimony
hearsay exception would not violate the Confrontation Clause because the former testimony
exception only admits evidence where the declarant was unavailable but had been cross examined
in another hearing or proceeding. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. The reach of Crawford and its
progeny transcends the interpretation of confrontation and has served as the vehicle for exploring
theories of originalism interpretation and consideration of the role of policy in constitutional
interpretation.
5. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
6. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-69 (describing, criticizing, and overruling Roberts).
7. See Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse and Trustworthiness Exceptions
after Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST. 24, 24 (2005-06) (“Crawford’s fallout is being felt throughout the
criminal justice system, but it has had a unique impact on domestic violence, child abuse, and elder
abuse cases where absent victims and witnesses had become commonplace.”).
8. By some calculations, as many as 80 percent of domestic violence victims recant their
accusations at some point or simply refuse to testify. See Celeste E. Byrom, The Use of the Excited
Utterance Hearsay Exception in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases After Crawford v.
Washington, 24 REV. LITIG. 409, 410 (2005) (citing EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 194 (3d ed. 2002)). Myrna Raeder,
Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child
Abuse, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 329 (2005) (“It became obvious relatively quickly in the fight
against domestic violence that the major impediment to obtaining convictions was that the majority
of battered women did not want to testify. Even when they appeared at trial, they often recanted
their accusations and generally were bad witnesses, resulting in relatively few convictions.”).
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violence victims’ excited utterances to admit the hearsay, which by definition
passed the toothless confrontation test of Roberts. After Crawford, those
statements, often the crux of the evidence (because police officers arrived
after the violence had been inflicted and could not testify to the occurrence
based on their personal knowledge), raise Confrontation Clause concerns.
Scholars generally agree that abandoning the ineffective approach of
Roberts, which merely collapsed the constitutional standard into the hearsay
rule, was a good idea. However, there is much more debate about the wisdom
and utility of the Court’s focus on “testimonial statements,” a category that
has presented some serious interpretive difficulties.9 Most of the confusion
and the subsequent Supreme Court opinions applying (one could not
rightfully say clarifying) Crawford entailed trying to distinguish testimonial
versus non-testimonial statements. The distinction is crucial because, as it is
now clear, the Confrontation Clause only applies to testimonial statements10
– whatever those are. Because we need some working definition, I propose
that we follow the suggestion of the National Association of Criminal
Defense lawyers, cited in Crawford, that testimonial statements are those
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.”11 The Court explained that “at a minimum” the
definition includes “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police interrogations.”12
Cases exploring the definition of “testimonial statements” fall into two
distinct categories. The first category includes cases of violence and mayhem
(only one of which, the most recent, does not involve an assaulted woman).13
The second category involves forensic laboratory reports, for example,
statements by a lab concerning whether the white powder found on the

9. In a series of narrow decisions that ducked difficult questions, see, e.g., Crawford, 541
U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
‘testimonial’”), the Court has bequeathed confusion and illogical distinctions for the lower courts
to puzzle out.
10. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause has no
application to [nontestimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack
indicia of reliability.”); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (“We . . . limited the
Confrontation Clause’s reach to testimonial statements.”).
11. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
12. Id. at 68.
13. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1143 (involving the identification of a shooter by his dying
victim). Although Crawford itself did not involve domestic violence, it concerned an attempt by
the accused to punish the victim for an attempted sexual attack on the accused’s wife. The first line
of the Crawford opinion reads: “Petitioner Michael Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly tried to
rape his wife, Sylvia.” 541 U.S. at 38.
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accused was cocaine.14 The lab analysis cases considered whether such
reports are testimonial and if so, who in the process of generating such reports
must be made available for cross-examination.15 Remarkably, an odd
combination of hysterical females and non-emotional, hyper-rational science
techies constitute the out-of-court declarants who have provided the factual
underpinnings for the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
Two of the earliest and most important cases deciding what statements
counted as “testimonial” involved domestic violence. The companion cases
of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana16 decided in 2006, two years
after Crawford, both concerned domestic violence victims who made
statements to police at the scene of their beating. The issue in both cases was
whether the victims’ out-of-court statements constituted testimonial
statements for confrontation purposes.17 The Court concluded that in Davis,
the victim’s statements were nontestimonial because the threat of violence
was still ongoing and “circumstances objectively indicat[ed] that the primary
purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency.”18 By contrast, in Hammon, the majority concluded that
the victim’s statements were testimonial (and hence inadmissible) because
there was “no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation [was] to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.”19
Because the focus here is on forfeiture, an exception to confrontation,
rather than on the rule of when confrontation applies, I need not consider
Davis and Hammon in detail. The cases are relevant to this analysis,
however, in one important respect: they serve as cultural artifacts that provide
insight into the Court’s attitude towards domestic violence. Elsewhere, I and
others have criticized the Court’s facile dualism between seeking safety (a
nontestimonial purpose) and reporting a crime (a quintessential testimonial
purpose) in the domestic violence arena where reporting a crime may be the
only way to seek safety and the threat is ongoing.20 I will raise a similar

14. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
15. See generally, Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, 45
TEX. TECH L. REV. 51 (2012) (discussing the lab report cases).
16. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (decided concurrently with Hammon v.
Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005)).
17. Id. at 817.
18. Id. at 822, 828.
19. Id. at 822, 829.
20. See Aviva Orenstein, Sex Threats and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v.
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 115
(2010); Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its Loss,
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concern about understanding and respecting women’s experiences regarding
forfeiture.
From the initial rollout of its new approach to confrontation, the Court
indicated that two possible exceptions existed to the Crawford rule, both of
which emanated from the common law at the time the Sixth Amendment was
written. The first exception is the dying declaration, a vehicle for admitting
evidence from absent declarants that the founders themselves recognized.21
Testimonial dying declarations, such as those made by the dying victim to
interrogators provided solely to convict the perpetrator, would be admissible
even though the victim was never available for cross examination concerning
her statements – a clear violation of the rule set out in Crawford.22 The
Supreme Court has never actually heard a dying declaration case, but has, in
increasingly forceful dicta,23 indicated that it is a “sui generis”24 exception to
its confrontation rule.
Similarly, an accused can forfeit confrontation rights by rendering a
witness unavailable. Reynolds v. United States25 involved an alleged
bigamist who before his trial sent his (alleged) second wife away so that she
could not testify against him.26 The Court affirmed that as a matter of equity
and respect for the trial process, a criminal defendant who makes a witness
unavailable cannot later be heard to complain that he cannot confront her in
court.27 In dicta, Crawford indicated that forfeiture remains a viable
exception to confrontation,28 and in 2008, the Supreme Court decided Giles

15 J.L. & POL’Y 725, 726 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s understanding of domestic violence is
“sufficiently inaccurate as to fatally undermine the coherence of both doctrine and theory”).
21. The dying declaration requires that: (1) the declarant is unavailable (usually this is satisfied
because the declarant actually did die); (2) the declarant had a sincere belief in her impending death;
and (3) the statement concerned the cause of death. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). It is available in
homicide and civil cases only. Id.
22. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
23. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008) (“We have previously acknowledged that
two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even though they were
unconfronted. The first of these were declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of
death and aware that he was dying.”) (citations omitted).
24. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 n.6.
25. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879) (“The Constitution does not guarantee
an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the
privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege.”).
26. Id. at 160.
27. Id. at 158.
28. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an
alternative means of determining reliability.”).
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v. California,29 which confirmed that forfeiture did indeed constitute an
exception to confrontation. The central issue in Giles, however, concerned
intent.30 The Court held that to qualify for the exception of forfeiture by
wrongdoing, the prosecution must show not only that the accused made the
witness unavailable, but must also prove that the accused “intended to
prevent a witness from testifying.”31 Mere knowledge of the consequences
of the accused’s actions would not suffice to trigger forfeiture; otherwise,
every voluntary homicide would also by necessity become a forfeiture case.
In Giles, the accused shot his unarmed ex-girlfriend, Brenda Avie, six
times before fleeing the scene.32 Despite a shot that appeared to be a
defensive hand wound and one that appeared to have entered her back after
she was already on the ground, at the murder trial Giles testified that he killed
Avie in self-defense.33 To rebut charges of Avie’s aggression, prosecutors
introduced evidence that three weeks before her death, Avie had made a
tearful, frightened complaint to the police at the stationhouse that Giles had
injured her and threatened her life.34 Because Giles killed Avie out of anger
and not to prevent her testimony (no charges were pending), the majority
deemed Avie’s prior out-of-court statement to police inadmissible.35 Her
statements were testimonial and did not fall under the forfeiture exception.36
In advocating a subjective intent requirement for forfeiture, Justice
Scalia chided the dissent for making the practical point that an intent
requirement would exclude vital evidence in domestic violence cases and, in
fact, create a perverse incentive to kill a partner, rather than just injure her.37
Justice Scalia distanced himself from and indeed mocked what he saw as
identity politics, writing:

29. Giles, 554 U.S. at 353.
30. Id. at 359-60.
31. Id. at 361-62.
32. Id. at 356.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 356-57.
35. Id. at 358, 377.
36. Avie’s statements to police did not fall under the dying declaration because she made them
without consciousness of imminent death. See generally Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying
Declarations and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141.
37. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 365. Breyer criticizes the majority’s approach, which “both creates
evidentiary anomalies and aggravates existing evidentiary incongruities. Contrast (1) the defendant
who assaults his wife and subsequently threatens her with harm if she testifies, with (2) the
defendant who assaults his wife and subsequently murders her in a fit of rage. Under the majority’s
interpretation, the former (whose threats make clear that his purpose was to prevent his wife from
testifying) cannot benefit from his wrong, but the latter (who has committed what is undoubtedly
the greater wrong) can. This is anomalous, particularly in this context where an equitable rule
applies.” 554 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The dissent closes by pointing out that a forfeiture rule which ignores
Crawford would be particularly helpful to women in abusive relationshipsor at least particularly helpful in punishing their abusers . . . [W]e are
puzzled by the dissent’s decision to devote its peroration to domestic abuse
cases. Is the suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the
one the Framers adopted and Crawford described) for all other crimes, but
a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for those crimes that are
frequently directed against women? 38

Hectoring tone aside, Justice Scalia, in addition to dismissing the
relevance of the real-world effects of his rulings,39 expressed antipathy for
any special rule in the domestic-violence context. Justice Scalia did,
however, note one potential important factor about domestic violence cases,
observing:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from
resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony
to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions . . . Earlier abuse,
or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside
help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing
criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to
testify.40

Although Justice Scalia rejected what he saw as the dissent’s championing of
special rules for the ladies, he did concede that a violent family dynamic
might indeed shed light on whether a chronic abuser rendered the victimwitness unavailable.
Justice Souter, who concurred in the judgment, providing a crucial fifth
vote in the 5-4 Giles decision, added an even more direct statement that,
though the forfeiture rules are the same for all types of cases, applying the
intent requirement would be easy in domestic violence cases.41 Justice Souter
wrote that there was no
reason to doubt that the element of intention would normally be satisfied by
the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help,
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the
38. Id. at 376 (majority opinion).
39. Justice Scalia has proven stubbornly disinterested in the practical effects of his Crawford
jurisprudence. This fact is notable in the lab analysis cases where Scalia has rejected arguments
about the impractical and essentially hollow burden Crawford places on the state. Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2008) (“The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution
of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—
is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”).
40. Giles, 544 U.S. at 377.
41. Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
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evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it
would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously
abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his victim, say
in a fit of anger.42

The context of domestic violence complicates the Court’s analysis in two
specific ways. First, as with most forfeiture cases in the domestic violence
context, the witness is also the victim. Unlike a witness who unluckily
happened to stumble upon a mafia hit in progress, the witness is herself the
one who was the target of the criminal behavior. Second, it is not just a
random person who perpetrated the crime against the witness, but an intimate
partner, often someone whom the witness loves or once loved. The accused
and the victim-witness know each other well and, based on their prior history
and perhaps even current intimacy, can engage in subtle forms of
communication without necessarily resorting to explicit threats, bribes, or
promises. How does the fact of an abusive relationship inform the
application of the intent requirement?
Professor Tom Lininger suggests taking Scalia up on what Lininger
deems Scalia’s invitation to think about how forfeiture might work in
domestic violence cases.43 In a thought-provoking, practical, and savvy
article, Lininger, a former prosecutor, proposes per se rules.44 He advocates
that courts should find the requisite intent where the defendant has done any
of the following: violated a restraining order; committed any act of violence
while judicial proceedings are pending; or engaged in a prolonged pattern of
abusing and isolating the victim.45 In providing this jurisprudential
framework Lininger hopes to “allow trial courts to apply Giles faithfully”
while still accounting for the special circumstances of a witness reporting
violence received at the hands of her intimate partner.46
How have trial and appellate courts interpreted Giles and applied it in
domestic violence cases? Have they quoted Justice’s Souter’s language or
adopted Professor Lininger’s per se standard? In attempting to figure out the
legacy of Giles, I searched post-Giles case law, both federal and state.
In reviewing the case law, I made one additional distinction, setting aside
the cases that, like Giles, ended in the death of the victim. So far unremarked
42. Id.
43. Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857 (2009).
44. Id. at 865.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington:
Three Constructive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521 (2010) (suggesting a rebuttable
presumption that an otherwise unexplained unavailability of a witness previously injured or
threatened by the accused is the result of improper pressure brought by the defendant).
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is the additional wrinkle presented in Giles that complicates the forfeiture
analysis: Giles falls within the gruesome subset of domestic violence cases
that result in femicide. Because Giles killed his girlfriend, she was, by
definition, unavailable to testify, and a per se rule arguably makes a lot of
sense. In this essay I focus on cases where the witness was alive and refused
to testify.47 This distinction complicates the analysis prompting us to wonder
whether we should also consider the motives of the absent witness, in
addition to the motives of the criminal defendant who made her
unavailable.48
In looking at the post-Giles domestic violence prosecutions that raised
the issue of forfeiture, but did not involve the death of the witness, I found,
unsurprisingly, that courts have employed many procedural mechanisms to
duck the forfeiture questions entirely. For instance, Courts elide an analysis
of forfeiture if the accused failed to make a timely confrontation objection at
the time the out-of court statements were introduced.49 Even if objected to,
courts often determine that, given the other strong evidence in the case,
admission of the unconfronted statements constituted harmless error.50 Many
of the cases challenging forfeiture arose on habeas. Giles, however, does not
apply retroactively because the absence of an intent requirement for forfeiture
does not meet the habeas standard of violating a clear constitutional rule
announced by the Supreme Court.51
47. In terms of intent in cases of femicide, either the accused killed the witness to prevent her
for appearing at another hearing (such as another incident of battery, or even something unrelated,
such as a custody matter), or he began beating the victim and realized that she would tell police and
needed to silence her entirely, so he decided in the course of the beating to kill her. See People v.
Zumot, No. BB943863, 2013 WL 6507459, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2013) (“[F]orfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine applies when a defendant purposely kills a witness to prevent the witness from
reporting the defendant’s conduct to the police.”).
48. Special interpretive questions abound in femicide case, including whether there must be
an “ongoing matter” at the time of the forfeiture and whether making the witness unavailable must
be the accused’s primary purpose in killing her. See Oregon v. Supanchick, 323 P.3d 231 (Or. 2014).
49. See, e.g., State v. Thaves, 175 Wash. App. 1012 (2013) (noting that on appeal defendant
did not challenge the lower court’s finding that the victim’s statements were properly admitted under
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing).
50. See, e.g., State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544, 644 (Kan. 2014) (“We need not settle this dispute
because we are persuaded that answering the question of whether any error on this [forfeiture] issue
was harmless is dispositive.”); State v. Lahai, 18 A.3d 630 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (noting that the
State had met its harmless-error burden); State v. Ivey, 427 S.W.3d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)
(choosing to not resolve the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing issue because even if admission of
testimonial statements were error, the defendant cannot show manifest miscarriage of justice if the
error went uncorrected).
51. A federal court can only grant an application for writ of habeas corpus if the original
adjudication of the claim: (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States;” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
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Courts also adopt substantive alternatives to forfeiture. For instance,
courts will not reach prosecutors’ forfeiture arguments because they accept
the alternative argument that the statement was nontestimonial and therefore
the confrontation right did not apply in the first place.52
In other cases, the Giles intent requirement for forfeiture is so easily met
that there is nothing of doctrinal interest (though the human interest
abounds).53 In some of these cases, where the accused is as stupid as he is
malicious, the prosecution introduces unassailable evidence of direct, violent
threats to the victim transmitted during conversations on the jailhouse phone,
which were, of course, recorded. 54 Although the contents of those
conversations are chilling, they pose no interpretive issues and the fact of
domestic violence does not influence the inquiry regarding the obvious intent
of the criminal defendant to make the witness unavailable.
I found and will consider here a few truly fascinating post-Giles cases
that raise important and nuanced questions about how to apply forfeiture in

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2012); see Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24–26 (2002). The Supreme Court held that
Crawford is not retroactive. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007). Lower courts have held
that Giles is not either. See, e.g., Ponce v. Felker, 606 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2010); Hand v. Houk, No.
2:07–cv–846, 2013 WL 2372180, at *18 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2013).
52. See, e.g., People v. Racz, No. B203267, 2010 WL 3387145 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2010)
(holding that murdered wife’s statements were nontestimonial and thus confrontation did not apply
and the forfeiture issue was moot); People v. Corpuz, No. A121199, 2011 WL 2412379 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 16, 2011) (holding wife’s phone call to police during a beating was nontestimonial and
any admission of her statements constituted harmless error); People v. Robles, 302 P.3d 269 (Colo.
App. 2011) (holding victim’s statements to friends and neighbors were nontestimonial and therefore
only excludable, if at all, by hearsay rules); State v. Shackelford, 247 P.3d 582 (Idaho 2010) (holding
victim ex-wife’s statements were admissible because they were nontestimonial and therefore did
not violate defendant’s confrontation rights).
53. See, e.g., State v. Dobbs, 320 P.3d 705, 706 (Wash. 2014) (noting that accused “engaged
in a campaign of threats, harassment, and intimidation against his ex-girlfriend, C.R., that included
a drive-by shooting at her home and warnings that she would ‘get it’ for calling the police and she
would ‘regret it’ if she pressed charges against him.”).
54. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Ct. App. 2012). Sometimes the threats
are to the economic security of the victim or to the safety of her children. See People v. Sanchez,
No. B246573, 2014 WL 3842889, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2014) (“[T]here was substantial
evidence appellant was engaged in repeated attempts to prevent Gonzalez from testifying, involving
discussions of money and even potential harm to her children.”). Sometimes both love and threats
are mingled together. See, e.g., People v. Smart, 989 N.Y.S.3d 631, 634 (N.Y. 2014) (accused
threatened on jailhouse telephone that if his girlfriend testified against him in a robbery case he
would “wring” her “fucking neck” but also presented her failure to appear in court as an act of love).
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the domestic violence context.55 In Commonwealth v. Szerlong,56 the accused
allegedly entered his girlfriend’s home, grabbed her by the throat while she
was asleep, and held a knife to her throat.57 The victim (who remained
unnamed in the opinion) did not report the incident; her sister did, against the
victim’s express wishes.58 The prosecutor moved in limine to admit hearsay
statements made by the victim to the police.59 When the prosecution
attempted to call the victim-witness to testify at a dangerousness hearing, she
refused on the grounds of spousal privilege.60 After the assault, but before
the trial, the victim married Szerlong.61 The question before the court was
whether by marrying the victim-witness, Szerlong intended to make her
unavailable to testify against him.62 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts concluded that he did and affirmed the conviction, which
admitted the victim-witness’ testimonial statements under the forfeiture
doctrine.63
In the prosecutor’s motion in limine in Szerlong, the government cited
evidence from the victim’s best friend that the victim explained to her “that
marriage was the only way that she would not have to testify” against

55. Cases involving child molestation present another difficult interpretative question. When
the molester, as he abuses his victim, warns the child not to tell, is he also triggering forfeiture? See
People v. Burns, 832 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. 2013) (not reaching the constitutional question and
holding that abuser’s warnings to child not to tell of sexual contact did not satisfy the Michigan
hearsay exception for forfeiture by wrongdoing); Thomas D. Lyon & Julia Dente, Child Witnesses
and the Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1181 (2012) (proposing a
“forfeiture by exploitation” approach in cases of child abuse whereby “courts should hold that
defendants have forfeited their confrontation rights if they exploited a child’s vulnerabilities such
that they could reasonably anticipate that the child would be unavailable to testify.”).
56. Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633 (Mass. 2010).
57. Id. at 637.
58. Id. at 640.
59. Id. at 637.
60. Id. Massachusetts recognizes a spousal testimonial privilege owned by the (would be)
testifying spouse. Massachusetts Guide to Evidence 504(a) provides that “[a] spouse shall not be
compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint, or other criminal proceeding brought
against the other spouse” and that “[o]nly the witness-spouse may claim the privilege. It does not
apply in civil proceedings, or in any prosecution for nonsupport, desertion, neglect of parental duty,
or child abuse, including incest. Traditionally, spousal privilege was owned by the accused spouse
(the husband) who could force his wife to stand by her man. This ancient privilege derives from
the unity of marriage (whereby the legal identity of the wife merged into the husband’s); since the
witness would not be forced to testify against himself, and legally, his wife was part of himself, she
could not testify either. A more modern approach maintains the spousal testimonial privilege but
renders it gender neutral and places the choice whether to testify into the hands of the spouse being
asked to testify. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
61. Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d at 637.
62. Id. at 641.
63. Id. at 638.
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Szerlong.64 The victim told her friend that “she had discussed the matter with
the defendant and they had decided to marry because they knew that, if they
were married, she would not have to testify against him.”65 Similarly, the
victim’s sister was prepared to testify that when she reported the violent
incident to the police, approximately one week after the violence had
occurred, she “knew of no plans for the victim and the defendant to marry.”66
The victim did not tell her family that she and Szerlong had married, and only
informed her sister so that she would not be surprised when the victim
invoked the spousal privilege in open court at the accused’s trial.67
I have deep concerns about the use of forfeiture in Szerlong. Perhaps the
marriage was merely a sham and, as the prosecution argued, the accused only
married the victim-witness to prevent her from testifying. If the accused
threatened the victim-witness with more violence if she did not marry him,
then such a forced marriage, like the forced exile in Reynolds, 185 years
earlier, would certainly constitute forfeiture. But nothing in the facts of
Szerlong indicate that the victim was intimidated into marrying her batterer.
It looks more like a choice made out of misguided loyalty and unhealthy
attachment than force or duress. Alternatively, perhaps she wanted to marry
him all along and the prospect of testimony prompted Szerlong’s proposal.
How can the law address the uncertain sway of emotional blackmail and
appeals to love? This question has arisen twice recently in New York trial
courts. In People v. Smith,68 a Kings County court applied forfeiture when
defendant had violated a court no-contact order, and called his girlfriend, the
victim-witness, over 300 times from jail, even though the prosecution could
present no evidence that Smith had threatened her with any harm. The court
explained that “[t]he power, control, domination and coercion exercised in
abusive relationships can be expressed in terms of violence certainly, but [is]
just as real in repeated calls sounding expressions of love and concern.”69 It
further noted: “Orders of protection are therefore issued by courts as much to
prevent assaults on the psyche of a vulnerable victim as to prevent assaults
on her person.”70 Two years later, in People v. Turnquest71 the court, citing
Smith (but oddly not mentioning Giles), held that the accused forfeited his
right to confront the statements of his wife, the victim-witness at his trial for

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d 860 (App. Div. 2010).
Id. at 861.
Id.
People v. Turnquest, 938 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
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assaulting her, including pushing her out of a moving vehicle.72 The court
found that the evidence demonstrated “quite convincingly that defendant’s
misconduct—his two surprise visits to Ms. Turnquest’s home, his barrage of
telephone calls to Ms. Turnquest, and his use of various third parties to
contact Ms. Turnquest, all in violation of the extant orders of protection—
caused the once completely cooperative complainant to become
unavailable.”73 Ms. Turnquest was actually willing to testify, but she planned
to recant her statements to police, saying that she voluntarily jumped from
the car going forty miles per hour.74 Through third parties, the accused tried
to “get Ms. Turnquest to prepare a document or ‘affidavit’ that defendant
intended to then submit to the ‘judge’ to get the charges ‘tossed’ out.”75
Notably both Smith and Turnquest involved breaches of a protective order,
one of Lininger’s three criteria for per se forfeiture.76
Similarly, in Garcia v. State,77 a Texas Court of Appeals affirmed
forfeiture, despite the Garcia’s arguments (conceded by the State during
trial), that he made no direct threats to his girlfriend, Cooper, to prevent her
testimony.78 Cooper had been assaulted, bound, choked, gagged with a
plastic bottle and hit in the back of her head.79 At the time of the beating,
Cooper exhibited fear of Garcia and great reluctance to report the incident.80
Garcia (who kept on encouraging Cooper to deal with his attorney and not
the prosecutor or police)81 never issued any threats. Instead Garcia told
Cooper, “Do whatever you have to do,” and warned her not to trust the
72. Id. at 752, 762.
73. Id. at 760.
74. Id. at 754.
75. Id. at 761.
76. Applying Professor Lininger’s approach, I find treating a history of domestic violence as
per se forfeiture even in the absence of actual threats or coercion both interesting and troubling.
Violation of a protective order seems to me the best case for per se application of forfeiture because
it demonstrates that accused would be willing to break the law. Again, however, a breach to
apologize or to check on the welfare of their children is different from a threat or leaving disturbing
messages on the witness’s phone.
77. Garcia v. State, No. 03-11-00403-CR, 2012 WL 3795447, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 29,
2012).
78. Id. at *10-11.
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *2-3.
81. Id. at *10. “In a letter written to Cooper in March 2011, approximately two months before
his trial was scheduled to begin, Garcia discussed the charges pending against him:
I’ve done my part. Now all that’s left is for you to do yours. You make sure you do everything
through my lawyer and not through your lawyer or the D.A. She will advise you on everything.
So once again do everything through my lawyer ( [name of defense counsel], my criminal
lawyer). F**k what your lawyer or the D.A. has to say. If they try and threaten you with
anything. You run to and talk about it with my lawyer.”
Id.
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prosecutors because they will “twist your words.”82 Garcia reminded her that
“what you do can affect my life.”83 In discussing the upcoming trial, Garcia
told her, “I just need to know where you stand; you don’t need to go at all”
and informed her that he was “pretty anxious about the trial.”84 Garcia also
told Cooper that their life together would be different based on whether he
“gets out soon” or “gets out later.”85 In their final conversation before trial,
Garcia asked Cooper about her thoughts regarding the prosecutors, telling
Cooper, “They’re out to screw us,” and, “I’m trying to shield you from . . .
these people.”86 The court, citing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Giles,
concluded that Garcia, through his persistent contact via mail and jailhouse
phone calls, persuaded Cooper to fail to appear in court to testify, even though
he did not directly threaten her.87 In this case, although I would reject a per
se finding of forfeiture, the facts support that Garcia, having issued threats in
the past was, per his attorney’s coaching, carefully issuing his threats in code.
This is different from an appeal to love.
The harder question is whether asking for the victim to preserve a
relationship or requesting a victim’s hand in marriage should always
constitute forfeiture. Is there any room for love and forgiveness so that a
victim might choose to marry her one-time abuser and might of her own
independent volition choose not to testify? If we treat all victims of domestic
violence who refuse to testify as necessarily intimidated, we deny their
agency and experience. By ignoring her sincere wishes, the law in some
cases may be complicit in the power dynamic that belittles and silences
victims of domestic violence.88
The facts of Szerlong underscore that the sole focus in forfeiture doctrine
is on the behavior of the accused, and not the experience and choices of the
witness. This focus on the accused makes sense given that the central
question of forfeiture revolves around the equity of preventing the accused
from benefiting from his bad behavior that rendered the witness unavailable.
But solely looking at the accused’s behavior and intent is also undesirable
because it gives no value, credence, or even consideration to the behavior,
intent, voice, and personhood of the victim-witness. No one inquires what
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *9-11.
88. Cf. Tamara L. Kuennen, Love Matters, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 979 (2014) (“Although
feminist legal scholars have unearthed the many rational reasons women experiencing abuse may
choose to preserve, rather than sever, their intimate relationships, we (feminist legal scholars) have
ignored love as a reason for staying.”).
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the witness-victim actually desires. Instead, her identity is reduced to her
status as a battered woman, one who apparently does not know her own mind
or act in her own best self-interest. She is per se deemed a sap or a
masochist.89 She does not realize that her marriage is a cruel joke.
In cases of outright physical threats and intimidation, one has little
trouble believing that analyzing the forfeiture question from the perspective
of the accused and the perspective of the witness-victim will lead to the same
result (though even in cases of violence, fear and love may mingle in a soup
of emotions). The case for forfeiture becomes murkier, however, where there
is love, forgiveness, or concern about who will support the family in the
batterer’s absence, and the accused has not acted to interfere directly with the
witness’s right to testify. What are the right questions to ask when a woman
simply refuses to testify because she loves the man who assaulted her or she
worries whether she and her kids can make it without him? Certainly, jailing
the woman as a material witness or holding her in contempt or otherwise
coercing her testimony seems abusive, a point that Myrna herself raised.90
The less intrusive approach, adopted in Szerlong, whereby the victim’s prior
statements are admitted under a combination of hearsay exceptions and
forfeiture, is also problematic and echoes some old debates.
As noted above, before Crawford, the prior statements of a witnessvictim were routinely admitted without the victim’s testimony because such
statements satisfied a firmly-rooted hearsay exception (usually the excited
utterance) and then, by definition satisfied the Confrontation Clause under
Roberts.91 Scholars debated whether trying such victim-absent cases92 was
in the best interests of women.93 In some respects, the issue is more pointed
and poignant when considering forfeiture. Pre-Crawford prosecutors with
non-drop policies simply did not care what the victim thought, and
determined, as keepers of the peace if not paternalistic know-it-alls, that
prosecuting the batterer was essential. However, in the area of forfeiture,
when a battered woman claims it is her own independent decision not to
testify because she loves the accused, we essentially tell her that she is
experiencing a false emotion and that, really, she has been intimidated and
89. Id. at 991-92 (“Women experiencing abuse are considered blameworthy or masochistic
when they want to preserve their intimate relationships. Particularly when their desire is based, even
partially, on love, it is viewed as maladaptive and even pathological.”).
90. Raeder, supra note 8, at 328-29 (noting that women who refuse to testify have faced threats
of imprisonment and criminal charges for child endangerment; some women have been jailed as
material witnesses).
91. Id. at 328.
92. These were sometimes called “evidence based” or “victimless” prosecutions. See Raeder,
supra note 7, at 24, in which Raeder aptly termed it “the witness lite/hearsay heavy approach.” Id.
93. See Orenstein, supra note 20, at 145-47.
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has not made a free choice even when there has been no threat of violence.
The Court in Szerlong essentially announced to the victim-witness that her
husband did not really love her and that his motive in marrying her was just
to (or primarily to – this point is unclear) prevent her testimony.94
From perspectives of safety and respect, legitimate and heart-wrenching
questions persist about whether to press a domestic violence prosecution
where the victim-witness adamantly does not want to testify or to send her
man to jail. Arguments in favor of respecting the victim’s wishes include the
fact that the victim may be in the best position to evaluate her own safety,
and that not testifying may be the safer choice for her and her children in the
long run.95 Also, from a safety perspective, there is cause to worry about a
system that uses statements made in emergencies against the accused (many
of which will not be testimonial at all). The victim’s willingness to call 911
to stop the beating may be very different from her willingness to send the
batterer to jail. A policy of using the victim’s statement without her
participation in the trial may simply result in fewer calls seeking help, even
when the victim is in grave danger. Finally, even if prosecutors have a
legitimate case against the accused, some women may not trust the efficacy
or fairness of the justice system, nor wish to participate in it, particularly if
the accused is a member of a minority group that tends to receive harsher
sentences and is overrepresented in the prison population.96
Aside from respecting the victim, other concerns arise about a broad
application of forfeiture in the domestic violence context, particularly where
the accused has not tried to dissuade the woman from testifying with violence
or threats. We cannot dismiss the valid civil libertarian concern that the
accused is deprived of cross-examining the statements of his accuser. If
courts adopt the per se rule that a history of intimate-partner violence equals
forfeiture, there is no way to confront statements that are false or exaggerated.
The accused’s status as a batterer and his past bad behavior forecloses a
precious constitutional right. We must allow for the possibility that one
reason a witness refuses to testify is that she does not stand by her original
statement to police. Although I doubt this happens often, we cannot construct
a system that presumes alleged victims of domestic violence never lie.
A categorical approach to domestic violence that treats all cases where
there is an established history of violence as forfeiture can in some cases deny
94. Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633, 641 (Mass. 2010).
95. See Raeder, supra note 8, at 329 (“A few researchers concluded that the empirical evidence
indicated that some classes of women were put at greater risk by aggressive prosecution, particularly
in misdemeanor cases where defendants were released pretrial, or received probation or short
sentences.”) (citations omitted).
96. See Orenstein, supra note 20, at 144-45.
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a woman her legitimate agency and deprive an accused of a fair trial. I agree
that the wheedling, cajoling, and contrition on the part of the accused may
seem false and just appear to be part of the cycle of violence between the
accused and the victim-witness, but I am not ready to say in the absence of
threats or bribes (overt or coded) that an offer to marry constitutes forfeiture.
My final question of course, is something I ask myself often in multiple
contexts: What would Myrna do? First, Myrna drew a stark distinction
between femicide cases and those where the victim-witness is alive and
chooses not to testify.97 Second, from the very beginning of Crawford’s
unfolding, because of her civil rights concerns, Myrna refused to expand
forfeiture too broadly where the victim-witness was indeed available. In
2005 she wrote, presciently: “While forfeiture is likely to be a factor in a
number of domestic violence cases, and prosecutors are correct to worry that
the testimonial approach gives defendant more incentive to keep women from
testifying, forfeiture cannot be assumed without specific evidence linking the
defendant to the witness’s failure to testify in cases where the victim is alive,
since there are so many potential reasons for her absence at trial.”98 In
commenting on Giles, Myrna enlarged upon with this reasoning, writing:
I have been more hesitant to substitute evidence of an abusive relationship
as evidence of forfeiture without evidence of duress or bribe when the
complainant is alive but refuses to testify, since so many complexities about
the relationship confound an automatic finding that the defendant is the
cause of her unavailability. In other words, that approach ignores reasons as
to her unavailability that cannot be attributed to acts of the defendant. 99

Finally, Myrna commented directly on Professor Lininger’s per se approach,
which she “applauded”100 but did not fully endorse. She observed that
“[u]ndoubtedly, the three types of evidence that Professor Lininger suggests
would be relevant to finding inferred intent,” but nevertheless rejected a “per
se rules mandate,” in favor of a “rebuttable presumption.”101 Once the bright
line approach of per se rules is rejected, we must, as Myrna indicated, wrestle
with the hard cases where love and psychological influence, rather than force
or bribes affect the witness-victim’s behavior.
I do not know how Myrna would have come out in Szerlong or in the
two New York cases where no force was used but instead the accused

97. See Myrna S. Raeder, Being Heard After Giles: Comments on the Sound of Silence, 87
TEX. L. REV. 105, 108-09 (“I have always distinguished murder from other domestic violence cases,
and pre-Giles argued for simple forfeiture without intent in murder cases.”).
98. Raeder, supra note 7, at 31-32.
99. Raeder, supra note 2, at 1346.
100. Raeder, supra note 97, at 109.
101. Id. at 110-11.
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resorted to cajoling and appeals to love. On the one hand, Myrna was keenly
aware of the dynamics of domestic violence that center on control, and could
rightly see the behavior of the accused as part of intimate partner violence
dynamic. On the other hand, she was cautious about overextending forfeiture
and denying the accused the right to confront the statement of witnesses who
so love the accused they refuse to testify. Myrna modeled candor and
compassion in her search for balance between the various rights involved.
She wrote: “As a feminist who is also concerned about the defendant’s right
to confrontation, I have long pondered the proper balance to ensure that the
voices of women and children are heard, without eviscerating the ability of
the defendant to confront live complainants, and not just second hand
witnesses.”102 Although I do not know how Myrna would have resolved this
tough and interesting question, I can say with certainty that I would have
loved to talk about it with her, and miss her deeply as a scholar, colleague,
and friend.

102. Raeder, supra note 8, at 313-14.

